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WHAT MOTIVATES LEGISLATORS TO ACT:
PROBLEM DEFINITION & THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC,

A CASE STUDY

TALEED EL-SABAWI*

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the partisan' gridlock2 that has been characteristic of federal
congressional behavior in recent years, legislators from both major parties have
worked together to draft and enact legislation to address the nation's current drug
problem, commonly referred to as the opioid epidemic.3 Even with the partisan
tendency for gridlock, such cooperation and action by congress may not come as
a surprise, especially given the record-setting number of drug overdose deaths.

* Doctoral Candidate, Graduate Teaching Associate, Graduate Research Associate, The
Ohio State University, College of Public Health, Division of Health Services Management and
Policy. Thank you to Micah Berman, Tom Wickizer, the 2016 Midwest Political Science
Association, and the 2016 American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics' Health Law Professors
Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Sandra Tanenbaum and her
unwillingness to accept "facts" at face value, her inquisitive mind and her tenaciousness. The time
and effort she invested in her multiple critiques not only transformed the article, but also changed
the way that I viewed some of the issues that I study and write about. Sincerest thank you.
1. See Parties Overview: Congress at a Glance, VOTEVIEW.COM, https://voteview.com/
parties/all [https://perma.cc/JM2S-96VX] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017) (taking Poole & Rosenthal's,
infra, measures of ideology for each legislator and creating an ideology score for the parties and
plotting them by year). Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal developed a measure of ideology for
each legislator based on her voting record in past roll call votes. See generally KEITH T. POOLE,
SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING

(Cambridge U. Press 2005). The measure, called

DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted NOMINAl Three-step Estimation), is widely used as a
measure of how liberal or conservative a legislator is based on her voting behavior. See Nolan
McCarty, Measuring Legislative Preferences, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN
CONGRESS (Eric Schickler & Frances E. Lee eds., 2011). The DW-NOMATE data is also used to
measure the growing polarization of the American Congress. See Keith T. Poole & Howard
Rosenthal The Polarization of American Politics, 46 J. POL. 1061-79 (1984). See also NOLAN
MCCARTY, KEITH

T.

POOLE

&

IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES

HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF

(2006).

2. The congressional gridlock has led to congress being referred to as largely unproductive.
See Drew DeSilver, Congress Still on Track to Be Among Least Productive in Recent History, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/23/congress-still-ontrack-to-be-among-least-productive-in-recent-history/ [https://perma.cc/A47E-PLV3].
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat.
1033 (2016).
4. See Nadia Kounang, US Drug Overdose Deaths Reach New Record High, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/health/drug-overdose-rates-2016-study/index.html
[https://perma.cc/38PK-G&S2] (last updated Aug. 8, 2017). See also Opioid Overdose:
Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
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However, Congress did not just enact legislation to address problem drug use.
It enacted legislation that embodied a more health-oriented approach than decades
of past legislation. And, it adopted such an approach almost unanimously.!
Moreover, many legislators defined problem drug use using terminology that
attributed the cause of the problem to medical or biological origins-creating
opportunities for the adoption of solutions that call for the involvement of health
actors. 6
Defining a social problem, like problem drug use, involves attributing the
cause of the problem to a source' and often results in assigning responsibility or
blame for the problem.' The problem definition is significant in that it shapes "the
perception of policy trade-offs" 9 and limits the policy alternatives available to a
class of solutions that addresses the problem, as it was defined.o In the case of
problem drug use, congress has seemingly redefined addiction as being caused
by a disease" or over-prescription as opposed to being caused by the drug user's
poor moral character. Such a re-definition align with the provisions in the
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act ("CARA")1 2-legislation comprised

drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/DN3L-3LKL] (last updated Aug. 30, 2017)
[hereinafter CDC].
5. CARA passed with a 94-1 vote in the Senate and a 400-5 vote in the House. See S. REP.
No. 1404-1416 (2016); H.R. REP. No. 2355-2368 (2016).
6. I use "solutions" here in the constructivist sense, not to imply that there is a correct or
proper solution for a problem but rather that there are multiple policies proposed with the intent of
solving a policy problem. I concede that oftentimes the policy proposals that are proposed or
enacted typically do not offer a complete solution. However, the proposer's intent was to solve at
least part of the policy problem.
7. THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION: SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA (David A.
Rochefort & Roger W. Cobb eds., 1994) [hereinafter Rochefort & Cobb].
8. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING(3rd
ed. 2012).
9. Isaac William Martin, Redistributing Toward the Rich: Strategic Policy Crafting in the
Campaign to Repeal the Sixteenth Amendment, 1938-1958, 116 AM. J. Soc. 1, 6 (2010).
10. STONE, supra note 8.

11. Some legislators in Congress have also blamed other parties aside from the drug user, like
physicians for overprescribing pain medication and pharmaceutical companies for downplaying the
addictive properties of opioid prescriptions. See, e.g., Harriet Ryan & Noam N. Levey, Lawmaker
Callsfor Scrutiny ofDrugMakers'RoleAmid OpioidAbuse Epidemic, L.A. TIMES (May 12,2016),

http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-oxycontin-react-20 1605 13 -story.html
[https://perma.cc/RDY4-8yTW]. See also Susan Brooks, House Acts to Address Heroin and Opioid

Abuse Crisis (July 8, 2016, 8:30 PM), https://susanwbrooks.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/house-acts-to-address-heroin-and-opioid-abuse-crisis [https://perma.cc/MMC2-4D97].
12. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695
(2016). CARA includes the provision of funding to expand treatment access to persons suffering
from addiction, calls for increased access to overdose reversal medication, encourages states to
establish prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), and instructs federal agencies to develop
education campaigns to help prevent overdoses and addiction, among other provisions. Id. Such
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mostly of health-oriented solutions used to address problems of disease. 3
Such problem redefinition, or substitution by the dominant problem definition
with another, 4 is rare, even without the complications of sharp ideological
divisions. Further, the institutionalization of policy solutions favors the status
quo." As time passes, the dominant policy solution becomes embedded in
legislation, regulations and agency guidelines, making it more resistant to
change." The institutionalization of policy solutions can also result in the creation
of organizations or agencies charged with implementation and
enforcement-creating another set of actors that may be invested in maintaining
the status quo. 17
Since the United States ("U.S.")'s criminal justice orientated problem
definition of problem drug use has been dominant for almost a century, with few
exceptions," a legislative redefinition of problem drug use as a health issue
necessitating health-oriented solutions can be viewed as a noteworthy change in
legislative orientation. Aside from the theoretical implications of this problem
redefinition, such a change has normative implications-including the de-

solutions can be considered "health-oriented" in that they invoke public health or medical solutions
that are used to address disease epidemics. I use the term "health-oriented" because although
CARA may not embrace a true public health approach, it samples some of the solutions typical of
a public health and medical approach and defers to health actors, as opposed to criminal justice
actors, for much of its implementation and enforcement.
13. More specifically, population health and disease management solutions align with
solutions for chronic diseases-the type of disease that addiction is now often categorized as. See,
e.g., Jane Murray Cramm & Anna Petra Nieboer, Is "DiseaseManagement" the Answer to Our
Problems?No! PopulationHealth Management and (Disease)PreventionRequire "Management
of Overall Well-Being", 16 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 500 (2016).
14. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINs, WHO
LOSES, AND WHY

(U. Chicago Press 2009).

15. Baumgartner et al.'s analysis of ninety-eight policy issues over four years demonstrated
only one instance of problem redefinition. Id. See also ANNE LARASON SCHNEIDER & HELEN
INGRAM, POLICY DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY (1997).

16. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 14. Baumgartner et al. conducted more than 300
interviews with policy-makers and organizations on a random sample of 98 policy issues for two
congressional sessions. Id. Their dataset included these interviews and publicly available
information with which they created measures of monetary and non-monetary resources that may
advantage some interest groups over others in influencing different phases of the policy process.
In their analysis of these interviews, the authors also analyzed problem redefinition. Id.
17. Id.
18. See DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA BEFORE

1940 (2d 2001) [hereinafter COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE]; DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES
OF HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2001) [hereinafter COURTWRIGHT,
FORCES OF HABIT]; DAVD F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL

(3d ed. 1999); FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE (Jonathon
Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) [hereinafter Erlen & Spillane].

INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW

192

[Vol. 15:189

stigmatization of problem drug usel9 and the substitution of more empirically and
comparatively supported health solutions 20 for the ineffective criminal justice
solutions utilized in the past.2 1
Given that the U.S. has preferred a criminal justice approach to addressing
problem drug use for almost a century, legislators' decision to adopt a healthoriented approach to address this drug crisis is significant. Some may argue that
congress' health-orientated approach was simply a result of shifting
demographics, 2 2 institutionalized racism,

23

or because the current drug crisis was

objectively caused by different factors than past drug problems. 24 Although these
theories have merit, they do not explicitly acknowledge the politics of problem
definition and its role in the legislative decision-making process. Too often, in
both legislative and legal scholarship, the role that problem definition plays in the
legislative process is ignored, downplayed, or simply forgotten. Aside from
omitting considerations of problem definition, such theories do not explain how
changes in demographics of the drug user population translated to enacted

19. The criminalization of possession of illicit substances in the U.S. has stigmatized problem

drug use and created a criminal subculture associated with drug use. See EDWIN

M. SCHUR, CRIMES

WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY: ABORTION, HOMOSEXUALITY, DRUG

(1965).
20. See TAMYKO YSA ET AL., GOVERNANCE OF ADDICTIONS: EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICIES
(2014) (providing a review of such solutions).
21. Criminal justice, punitive solutions, or supply side solutions have not only been deemed
ineffective by foreign governments, former U.S. President Barack Obama and former Drug Czar
Michael Botticelli. See Bermd Debusmann, Obama and the Failed War on Drugs, REUTERS (Apr.
16, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-debusmann-drugs/obama-and-thefailed-war-on-drugs-bernd-debusmann-idUSBRE83FOZR20120416
[https://perma.cc/4YCPCAAP].
22. While drug epidemics of the 1980s and 1990s primarily affected African Americans, the
current opioid epidemic has purportedly affected White Americans at greater rates than minority
populations. Recent data, however, suggests that the overdose rates of racial and ethnic minorities
are increasing and approaching those of Whites. Meredith S. Shiels et al., Trends in U.S. Drug
Overdose Deathsin Non-HispanicBlack, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic White Persons, 2000-2015,
ADDICTION

168

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

453 (2018).

23. Institutionalized racism refers to racism that is imbedded in political or societal
institutions. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). Historically, in the U.S., punitive solutions have been pursued to address
problem drug use most often when the drug users come from marginalized populations, including

racial minorities. See

COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18. See also Taleed E1-Sabawi,
Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure Groups and Problem Definition, U. Memphis
L. J. 2018.
24. In the past, government agencies may have defined the nation's drug problem as being
characterized by street drug use, in describing the current epidemic, federal agencies have focused
more so on attributing the cause to over-prescription. See America 's Addiction to Opioids: Heroin
and PrescriptionDrug Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Nora D. Volkow, Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse).
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legislation that changed the path of U.S. drug policy. Although this may be the
U.S.'s largest overdose epidemic involving primarily white Americans, this is
neither the U.S.'s first overdose epidemic affecting Whites, nor is it the first drug
epidemic that has been blamed on prescribers and drug manufacturers. 25 These
explanations may be true, but are at best an incomplete list of factors that might
have contributed to legislators' 26 decisions to adopt a health-oriented approach.
This article explores why legislators approached problem drug use as a health
problem as opposed to a criminal justice problem when deciding how to address
the nation's opioid epidemic. This article analyzes theories of legislative behavior
in an effort to identify the factors that influence legislators to redefine a social
problem, in general, and problem drug use in particular. In doing so, this article
proposes that the factors that most likely influenced legislators' decision to adopt
a health-oriented approach to this opioid epidemic include: local needs, voter
preferences, and interest group and administrative preferences (collectively,
"pressure group preferences").
Part II of this article provides an overview of the problem redefinition that
was evidenced by CARA and discusses its significance. Part III analyzes theories
of legislative behavior and ends with a legislative decision-making framework
tailored to the political climate and issues surrounding the opioid epidemic. Part
IV analyzes each factor identified in the proposed framework in depth and
provides evidence of each factor's influence on the redefinition of problem drug
use as health issue. Lastly, Part V summarizes the proposed framework, suggests
additional avenues for research, and briefly discusses the practical utility of the
proposed framework.
II. CARA AND THE REDEFINITION OF PROBLEM DRUG USE

Due to a historically high number of opioid overdose deaths and the
quadrupling of opioid overdoses since 1998, both the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") and Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") have declared
that we are amidst an opioid overdose epidemic.2 7 in response to this opioid

&

25. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; MUSTO, supra note 18. For an in
depth comparison of the current Opioid Epidemic to past drug epidemics in U.S. history and a
justification for such a comparison, please see El-Sabawi, supra note 23.
26. When I refer to legislators in this paper, I am referring to federal legislators who were in
office during the proposal and passage of CARA.
27. According to data compiled from the CDC, more people died of drug overdoses in 2015
than any other year before it. See CDC, supra note 4. Approximately 60% of these overdoses
involved an opioid. See Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose
Deaths-UnitedStates, 2010-2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445-52
(2016). Approximately half of the opioid overdoses were attributed to prescription opioids. See
CDC, supra note 4; see also The Opioid Epidemic: By the Numbers, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
HUMAN SERVs., https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/Factsheet-opioids-061516.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92WN-UTH7] (last updated June 2016).
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overdose death epidemic,28 (hereinafter referred to as "opioid epidemic")
Congress, on July 13, 2016, passed CARA.
The current opioid epidemic is not the first that Congress has faced.29
However, CARA is arguably the first comprehensive legislative response to
problem drug use that promotes health solutions 30 over criminal justice solutions.
For the greater part of a century, legislators in the U.S. Congress have
predominately adopted policy solutions that deferred to the criminal justice
system to solve the nation's drug problem. Such criminal justice solutions
involved the use of criminal sanctions to punish the drug user, to deter his bad
behavior, and to punish the supplier, including the drug's country of origin.31
Incarcerating drug users was justified as one of the only proven methods to keep
the drug user from harming himself and to protect society from the drug users'
dangerous behavior.32 Congressional representatives competed to demonstrate to
voters who was the "toughest" on drugs, by supporting the use of tougher
criminal sanctions against those who sold or possessed illicit substances. 33
Congressional support for such solutions was steadfast, despite convincing
empirical and comparative evidence that had existed since at least the 1960s,34
demonstrating that utilization of a health approach, an approach that emphasizes

28. It is important to note that Congress was specifically responding to an overdose death
epidemic and not a rise in addiction rates. Federal government agencies, like Health and Human
Services and the Centers for Disease Control, have defined the current problem as an overdose
epidemic and in their definition of the problem, do not refer to the problem as an addiction
epidemic. See CDC, supranote 4.
29. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; MUSTO, supranote 18.
30. See generally DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON (1988)
(providing an overview of how policy solutions are crafted in the policy-making process to address
social problems). Both health solutions and criminal justice solutions are defined infra.
31. See MUSTO, supra note 18; Erlen & Spillane, supranote 18.
32. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supranote 18.

33. Id.
34. For example, in 1958, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Medical
Association (AMA) teamed up to author a special report urging the federal government to reverse
its previous hard line anti-harm reduction and anti-maintenance approaches to addressing problem
drug use. Although the report was based on empirical evidence, it was dismissed as fiction by
administrative agency officials and Congress determined to continue with the criminal justice
approach. The AMA and ABA finally found supporters in the Kennedy administration's Advisory
Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, which also recommended the investment in methadone
maintenance treatment and a greater emphasis on treatment as the solution for problem drug use.
See EDWARD M. BRECHER & THE EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS: THE
CONSUMERS

UNION

REPORT

ON

NARCOTICS,

STIMULANTS,

DEPRESSANTS,

INHALANTS,

HALLUCINOGENS, AND MARIJUANA-INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL (1972).

However, the focus on a health approach was brief. When President Nixon took office, he
declared a War on Drugs and emphasized the executive's commitment to a criminal justice and
supply side emphasis. In his rhetoric, President Nixon associated drugs with crime and targeted
young Black males as the leading culprits. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18.
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medical and public health methods for both treating and preventing problem drug
use, would have been more effective at addressing problem drug use.3 5
Despite the empirical evidence, criminal justice solutions were supported by
actors who depicted the drug user or populations at risk for drug use as persons
of weak character, who could not help but give in to the seduction of a high, no
matter the cost.3 6 Historically, the dominant 37 problem definition 38 in drug policy
has been that the drug user's poor moral character and his inability to refrain from
engaging in hedonistic behavior caused his drug use.39 This causal storyo limited
the policy alternatives to legislative solutions that included punishment and
supply reduction-solutions aimed at punishing the drug user's bad behavior and
keeping drugs away from him to decrease the likelihood of his use. Any healthoriented solutions, which may have included prevention, treatment and medical
management of the user ("health solutions"), were treated as secondary solutions,
at best.4 1 The dominant causal narrative argued that to rid the user of the bad
behavior, he must be punished and rehabilitated, not offered treatment.
Punishment was the proper solution for the deviant, while treatment was a
solution reserved for the ill.4 2 In sum, since the early 1900s,43 federal law had
largely characterized drug users as "undesirable and criminal"44 and unworthy of
public assistance. Legislators' adherence to this causal theory of deviance, and the
criminal justice solutions that accompanied such a narrative, was steadfast,
despite scientific evidence that demonstrated that factors outside of the drug user
contributed to his addiction.
This is not to say that there were not any efforts to address problem drug use
with more health-oriented solutions. Some legislation addressed treatment and

35. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; YSA ET AL., supra note 20.
36. MERRILL SINGER & J. BRYAN PAGE, THE SOCIAL VALUE OF DRUG ADDICTS: THE USES
OF THE USELESS (2014).
37. Individuals and groups compete to define problems in the policy arena. As such, there
are often multiple problem definitions for a single policy issue. The dominant problem definition
is the problem definition that is accepted by the majority of actors as the explanation for the cause
or source of the issue. See Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 7.
38. Throughout this proposal, I will use "problem definition" to represent both what is
referred to by Rochefort and Cobb and Stone as defining a problem and to represent what other
scholars refer to as "issue framing" or "issue definition." Rochefort & Cobb, supranote 7; STONE,
supra note 8. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 14 (referring to it as "issue definition").
39. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; Courtwright, Forces of Habit, supra
note 18; MUSTO, supra note 18. See also SCHUR, supranote 19.
40. The elements of causal stories and the strategic manner in which they are used in
policymaking are outlined in Part III infra.
41. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; MUSTO, supranote 18.
42. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18.
43. In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Tax Act. Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, Ch. 1, 38
Stat. 785 (1914) (superseded by the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C. (2012)).
44. SINGER & PAGE, supranote 36, at 168.
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prevention. However, it was in conjunction to and overshadowed by proposals for
criminal justice-oriented solutions, as was the allocation for funding to implement
and enforce criminal justice proposals.4 5
CARA was passed in 2016 despite this criminal justice oriented policy
history. CARA was a bi-partisan bill that passed with an overwhelming majority
in both the House and the Senate4 6 during a time of tremendous division between
the Republicans and Democrats.
It radically diverges from the U.S.'s historic criminal justice legislative
approach4 7 because of its utilization of health-oriented solutions over criminal
justice solutions. For example, CARA increases federal funding to the states for
treatment of drug addiction and overdoses. CARA increases access to medication
assisted treatment providers and requires federal and state agencies to disseminate
more information to consumers about the risks of prescription opioid abuse,
among other provisions.4 8 CARA even focused attention on the potential
consequences of the U.S.'s previous legislative commitment to a criminal justice
approach 4 by requiring the U.S. Government and Accountability Office

45. Notably, even prior to CARA, legislators often opined that the proper solution for classes
of addicts that were addicted iatrogenically, or by medical error, was treatment, preferably in a
private facility. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18. After the early 1900s, the number
of iatrogenic addicts dwindled as did the popularity of treatment as a solution.
COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supranote 18. The preference for criminal justice solutions over
treatment solutions is evidenced by the discrepancy between funding allocations to criminal justice
enforcement vs. treatment and other health oriented responses. See GONZENBACH, infra note 83.
46. See S. REP. No. 1404-1416 (2016).
47. When I refer to a criminal justice approach here and throughout this paper, I am referring
to a category of proposed solutions that involve the use of criminal sanctions to deter behavior and
result in processing the accused individual in the criminal justice system. The frame of criminal
justice is used to define the social problem and often leads to the use of punitive problem solutions.
Regarding explicit vs. implicit criminal justice approaches, I use the word "explicit" to signify a
total criminal justice solution, as opposed to a hybrid solution. For example, CARA encourages
states to develop prescription monitoring programs, a policy solution that can be considered a
health solution, in so far as it is used to identify patients that need addiction treatment, and a
criminal justice solution, in so far as it is used to provide law enforcement with information on the
prescribing practices of physicians that they may prosecute criminally. CARA also includes
provisions that expand access of medication-assisted treatment to incarcerated substance abusers,
applying a health solution within the criminal justice system.
48. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695
(2016).
49. Almost all major federal drug legislation has emphasized a criminal justice approach to
dealing with problem drug use. See Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937)
(repealed 1970); Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970); Narcotics
Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (repealed 1970); Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act (CDAPCA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.,
40 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L. No.
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("GAO") to prepare a report on the "collateral consequences""o of criminalization
for individuals who were convicted of non-violent drug possession."
Legislators not only adopted health-oriented solutions when enacting CARA,
but also redefined the problem of drug use as a health issue. Legislators who
authored the bill redefined problem drug use as a health problem, caused by a
disease or disorder of the body and mind-a problem definition that clearly
differs from past criminal justice problem definitions of deviance and poor moral
character.5 2 As Republican Senator Robert Portman, who authored the Senate
version of the CARA, noted:
This is a historic moment, the first time in decades that Congress has
passed comprehensive addiction legislation, and the first time Congress
has ever supported long-term addiction recovery. This is also the first

91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968); Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012); Posse
Comitatus Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat 1099, 1114-16;
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 31 U.S.C.); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; AntiDrug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4312; and Crime Control
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18

U.S.C.).
There were a few departures from purely criminal justice oriented legislative. Arguably, the
Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 and the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 were
less criminal justice and more "medical treatment" focused. See COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE,
supra note 18, at 163; Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226
(1965); Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438 (1966). But
both pieces of legislation were replaced two years later by Nixon's CDAPCA, so they did not have
a lasting effect. The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, which resulted in the creation
of NIDA, and the 1974 legislation that created the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration ("ADAMHA"), which later became SAMHSA, were not criminal justice oriented
either, but only resulted in the creation of agencies within the administration. See Drug Abuse
Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65 (codified as amendment 21
U.S.C. §§ 1101-81); ADAHMA Reorganization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat. 323
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Moreover, the 2007 Second Chance Act
focused on increasing treatment options and rehabilitation options to those who had been convicted
and completed their sentence. See 2007 Second Chance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Although this footnote does not
provide an exhaustive list of legislation, it provides the reader with an overview of the legislation
that is most typical of U.S. drug policy.
50. According to Title IV, Sec. 401 of CARA, collateral consequences are penalties or
disadvantages imposed on such individuals by law, an administrative agency, or a court, not
including consequences imposed at sentencing. See Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act
of2016 § 401(b).
51. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act § 401.
52. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18; MUSTO, supranote 18.
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time that we've treated addiction like the disease that it is, which will
help put an end to the stigma that has surrounded addiction for too long.53
CARA was soon funded by the 21"' Century Cures Act with an unprecedented one
billion dollars, perhaps demonstrating a more serious commitment to a healthoriented approach to problem drug use.
This problem redefinition by Congress leads one to ask: Why such a change
and why now? Further, what motivated legislators to act to change drug policy
given their inaction in other policy areas?
III. WHAT MOTIVATES LEGISLATORS' BEHAVIOR?

A. A Legislator's Goals: General Theory

Although most scholars would agree that legislative behavior is motivated by
a variety of factors, they disagree as to which of these factors is most influential.
I briefly outline a few competing theories, including those that emphasize party
preferences, cues from other legislators and even legislators' own personal
preferences as central motivators. I then summarize more comprehensive models
of legislative decision-making, including Kingdon's Consensus Model-the
model upon which I base my framework. I analyze each theory, ascertaining its
strengths, weaknesses, and utility in explaining legislative behavior as applied to
the opioid epidemic. The summary below is by no means exhaustive, but offers
a short review of the theory on legislative decision-making and provides the
foundation needed to justify the legislative decision-making framework that I
propose for analyzing the opioid epidemic at the end of Part III.
1. The Party

Some scholars, like Cox and McCubbins, argue that legislators consider their
party preferences before casting a vote.54 They argue that parties act as cartels
influencing legislators to vote in the best interest of the party, even if it means
voting in opposition to district preferences." Other scholars disagree, arguing that
party is just a label for legislators that already have similar preferences and that
legislators are just voting their preferences.56 Aldrich and Rohde take the middle
road and argue for conditional party government, articulating the conditions

&

53. Press Release, Rob Portman, Portman, Whitehouse, Ayotte, Klobuchar Cheer Final
Passage of Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (July 13, 2016).
54. See GARY W. Cox & MATHEw DANIEL MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (Cambridge U. Press, 2nd ed. 2007). See also GARY W. Cox
MATHEw DANIEL MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE

U.S. HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005). See also Tim Groseclose & James M. Snyder,
Interpretingthe Coefficient ofParty Influence: Comment on Krehbiel, 11 POL. ANALYSIS, Winter
2003, at 104-07.
55. Some scholars argue that political parties also influence legislative behavior. However,
once controlling for ideology and voting records, evidence for an independent party effect is weak.
See Keith Krehbiel, Where's the Party?,23 BRIT. J. POL. Sd. 235, 235-66 (1993).
56. Id.
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necessary for the party to influence legislators independently." In sum, the
literature is undecided as to the degree to which, if at all, party affiliation affects
legislator votes. However, the straight party line votes that have been the
hallmark of health policy for the last eight years provide some anecdotal evidence
that in at least some circumstances parties can influence a legislator's voting
behavior." Since members of both parties drafted and voted for the adoption of
CARA's health-oriented approach, at the surface, party membership does not
seem to explain legislator behavior, at least in this instance of drug policymaking.
2. Cue-Taking
Matthews and Stimson, among others, argue that legislators take cues from
one another as to how to vote on an issue in order to cut the information costs
associated with making a decision on how to vote.5 9 Similarly, Truman finds that
legislators often form blocs with other legislators who have common interests,
and they consult with these blocs on issues prior to votes.6 0 Even if such cuetaking is influential, it seems most influential on issues that legislators'
constituents do not have intense preferences. 6 1 Since constituents typically have
opinions and preferences on drug policy issues, cue-taking would likely be less
influential on the legislators' decision-making process.6 2
3. LegislatorPreferences
Other scholars argue that even if party pressure and cue-taking influence
legislative behavior, the factor that is most likely to predict a legislator's vote on
an issue is her own personal ideology.6 3 Such ideology is said to supersede even
constituent preferences and re-election considerations.6 4 To support such claims,
scholars point to studies that show that there is low congruence between legislator

57. John H. Aldrich & David Rohde, The Consequences ofPartyOrganizationin the House:
The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in ConditionalParty Government, in POLARIZED
R. Bond & Richard Fleisher ed.,
2000).
58. See generally JOHN E. McDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM (2012).
59. See Donald Matthews & James Stimson, Decision-making by U.S. Representatives, in
POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 14-43 (S. Sidney Ulmer, ed., 1970). See also DONALD MATTHEWS
POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (Jon

& JAMES STIMSON, YEAS AND NAYS: NORMAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE
REPRESENTATIVES

60.

U.S.

HOUSE OF

(1975).

DAVID TRUMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL PARTY

(1959).

61. John W. Kingdon, Models ofLegislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563-95 (1977).
62. See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 18, which provides evidence of legislators' efforts to
please their constituency by being tough on drugs. There does not appear to be any systematic
analysis of legislative cue-taking on the issue of drug policy.

63.

CLEO CHERRYHOLMES & MICHAEL SHAPIRO, REPRESENTATIVES AND ROLL CALLS

(1969).

Keith T. Poole, ChangingMinds? Not in Congress!, 131 PUB. CHOICE, 435, 435-51 (2007); Keith
T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patternsof CongressionalVoting, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI., 228, 228-78
(1991); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Are Legislators Ideologues or the Agents of
Constituents?, 40 EUROPEAN EcON. REV. 717,717 (1996) [hereinafterPOOLE& ROSENTHAL 1996].
64. POOLE & ROSENTHAL 1996, supra note 63.
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votes and district preferences.6 5 The literature on policy congruence proves more
often than not that legislators' votes do not align with the majority of voters'
preferences or the median voter's preference in their local districts-leading some
scholars to question the degree to which legislators consider their constituents'
policy preferences. 6 6 Normatively, such behavior can be justified by the "trustee
view" of legislative representation, wherein a legislator's duty is to vote in a
manner that she believes is in the best interest of her district, even if such a vote
is not reflective of the preferences of her constituents.6 7 Despite the evidence
supporting legislator ideology as the primary predictor of a legislator's behavior,
CARA's vote was a "lopsided vote with no ideological division",6 8 suggesting
that factors aside from ideology influenced legislators' decisions to adopt a
health-oriented approach to addressing the opioid crisis.
4. Models ofLegislative Decision-making
According to Fenno (1973) in his seminal work on Congress, Congressmen
in Committees, legislators are motivated by three main goals: re-election,
influence within Congress, and good public policy. Mayhew and other scholars6 9
argue that the goal of re-election is the most central motivating factor for
legislators, for re-election must be achieved before any other goals can be met.7 1
Building on Mayhew and Fenno's work, Kingdon developed a "Consensus
Model." To do so, he conducted 200 interviews of legislators and identified actors
who legislators considered prior to voting on an issue. He found that these actors
were voters, interest groups, administrative agencies, and fellow legislators.7 1
While considering these actors' preferences, legislators also reported considering
their own preferences 72 and voting record. Although Kingdon's work on
legislative decision-making precedes some of the studies cited above, his
consensus framework combines theories of legislative behavior and, surprisingly,

65. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The DemocraticDeficit in the States, 56 Am. J. POL.
Sd. 148, 148-66 (2012); John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of PublicPolicy: A Quantitative
Approach, 5 Q. J. POL. SC. 133, 133-67 (2010).
66. See Part IR for a more in depth discussion of policy congruence.
67. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slavinski, A Model of Political Competition with CitizenCandidates, 111 Q. J. POL. Sd. 65, 65-96 (1996); Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, An Economic
Model ofRepresentative Democracy, 112 Q. J. POL. Sd. 85, 85-114 (1997).
68. For the House vote, see Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., VOTEVIEW: CONGRESSIONAL ROLL-CALL
VOTES DATABASE (2017), https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH1141099
[https://perma.cc/CX2Z6NZF]. For the Senate vote, see Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., VOTEVIEW: CONGRESSIONAL ROLL-CALL
VOTES DATABASE (2017), https://voteview.com/rollcall/RS 1140373 [https://perma.cc/8Y82-9LE7].
69. See also MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES

(1974).
70. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
71. Kingdon, supranote 61.
72. Id. Since a legislator's ideology is often strongly correlated with the ideology of her
constituents, it is difficult to ascertain the independent effect of ideology after controlling for
constituent ideology. Id.
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also addresses factors that were later identified by scholars as influential.73
Kingdon's model demonstrates that legislators' primary goals are to satisfy
constituents, increase or maintain intra-Washington influence, and create good
public policy.74 Elaborating on the factors in his model, Kingdon argues that
legislators consider constituency preferences, not only when they are up for reelection, but do so throughout their term and anticipate re-election consequences
far in advance." Kingdon's goal of intra-Washington influence expands on
Fenno's conceptualization, by including not only fellow members of Congress,
but party leadership and the administration, thus including "party" as a factor.
Lastly, Kingdon conceptualizes good public policy as a reflection of legislators'
"policy attitudes, their ideology."" This definition of good public policy
demonstrates that Kingdon's model includes legislative ideology or preferences
as factor in a legislator's decision-making process.
Kingdon's model can be differentiated from other models in that he attempts
to map out the factors in the order that they are considered by a legislator.
According to Kingdon's model, first, a legislator votes with the consensus of her
environment. If there is controversy over how she should vote, then she will be
most persuaded by voters and interest groups. Voters and interest groups are most
effective if their opinions are "intense" and the issue is salient." Kingdon found
that this held true regardless of whether an election is near or whether the
legislator is in a safe seat. Kingdon notes however that a legislator does not
necessarily consider all voters and interest groups, but may, for example, consider
a narrow subset of her constituents."
Kingdon's model of legislative decision-making provides a framework with
which to explore why legislators redefined problem drug use when enacting
CARA. The factors from Kingdon's model which seem most relevant are
constituents' and interest groups' preferences. The issue of opioid misuse and
opioid overdoses have been salient in the media. As such, if voters and interest
groups demonstrate "intense" and clear support for a health-oriented approach to
addressing the opioid epidemic-Kingdon's model would suggest that their
preferences will heavily influence legislators' decisions to support health-oriented
proposals. Conversely, Kingdon's model would also suggest that, in the past,
when Congress enacted criminal justice oriented legislation, constituents were
either silent or intense in their support for the criminal justice proposals. If voters
and groups do not voice especially strong opinions on how to address problem
drug use, then the legislators' considerations would shift to intra-Washington

73. For example, Kingdon confirmed that legislators consulted their own individual
preferences. Kingdon, supra note 61. These "preferences" are the predecessors for what scholars,
like Poole & Rosenthal, later quantified as "ideology."
74. Kingdon, supranote 61.
75. Id. at 570-71.
76. Id. at 571.

77. Id.
78. Id.
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actors, including fellow legislators and the administration.7 9 These possibilities
will be explored infra.
Kingdon's model also identifies administrative agency preferences as an
input in the legislative decision-making process. Drug policy historians provide
ample evidence that at various points in U.S. history federal administrative
officials have influenced the problem definition of drug use, by at times
publishing reports that over-estimated the number of addicts in the country in
order to make drug use appear more widespread," and at other times, publishing
statistics that selectively highlighted the apparent success of the criminal justice
approach." Historically, administrative officials have also publicly denounced
Medication Assisted Treatment ("MAT") policy solutions and have actively
worked to discredit research reports supporting its efficacy.8 2 Legislators have
cited such reports and administrative agency official testimony as support for
their policy positions on drug issues.8 3 According to Kingdon's model, however,
these administrative agency preferences would have been at the forefront of a
legislator's considerations only when constituents' preferences were not intense.
5. ProposedFrameworkfor Analyzing Legislative Decision-makingin Drug
Policy
The legislative behavior theories discussed above outline certain factors that
may influence a legislator's decision to support a particular problem definition
or policy solution. Each theory reviewed is supported by evidence; however, in
no case is the evidence conclusive. Further, each theory may interact with issue
specific variables unique to that policy domain. The identified factors may be
influenced or restricted by policy history and policy path dependence. Its factors
may also be affected by specialized institutions that may not be active on all
issues. For example, the institutions at both the state and federal level that are
affected by drug policy differ from those that are affected by tax reform. As such,
the utility of each theory in explaining legislative decision-making will likely
differ depending on the type of issue addressed.
In sub-sections 1-3, I briefly outlined why it is unlikely that party pressure,
cue-taking, and legislator ideology explain legislators' decisions to adopt a health

79. Further, Kingdon found that the administration is especially persuasive if the President
is of the same party. Kingdon, supra note 61. Whitford and Yates extend this claim arguing that
regardless of the party of the president, most U.S. presidents have utilized rhetoric to affect the
types of policy proposals adopted to address problem drug use. See ANDREw B. WHITFORD & JEFF
YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS

(2009).
80. MUSTO, supra note 18; Erlen & Spillane, supranote 18.
81. Such statistics focused on reporting increases in the number of drug related arrests as
opposed to statistics highlighting better treatment outcomes for problem drug users. See MUSTO,
supranote 18; Erlen & Spillane, supra note 18.
82. See Erlen & Spillane, supra note 18; MUSTO, supranote 18.
83. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18. See also WILLIAM J. GONZENBACH, THE
MEDIA, THE PRESIDENT, AND PUBLIC OPINION:

1984-1991 (1996).
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approach to address the opioid epidemic. I argued that the insights such theories
could provide were limited due to the bipartisan support for a health-oriented
approach in 2016. Of the theories summarized in this article, Kingdon's
Consensus Model appears to be most useful in identifying factors that may have
influenced legislators to adopt a health approach to the opioid epidemic.
Kingdon's model provides a useful organizational framework for which to
begin our analysis. In the following section, I will build upon Kingdon's
framework, tailoring it to address drug policy specific issues. Further, I will
demonstrate that legislators may have supported the enactment of health-oriented
proposals, as embodied by CARA, because doing so allowed legislators to both
protect their re-election prospects and create good public policy by (1) solving a
pressing social problem that affects local voters ("Local Needs Consideration")
using health-oriented policy proposals (2) supported by voters ("Voter
Preferences Consideration"), (3) supported by organized interest groups ("Interest
Group Preferences Consideration"), and (4) that had buy-in from the
administrative agencies responsible for enforcement ("Administrative Preferences
Consideration"). For each factor, I will begin with a review of the literature that
supports the factor's inclusion in the proposed legislative decision-making
framework. I will then follow with evidence of each factor's relevance as applied
to legislative decision-making in relation to drug policy and the opioid epidemic.
IV. A LEGISLATOR'S CONSIDERATIONS
A. Local Needs Considerations
1. TheoreticalJustification
Legislators want to solve problems that affect their local districts and that are
considered important by their voting constituents. One way legislators can fulfill
both of these considerations is to direct federal money to programs that address
a salient local issue.8 4 Because the public is often unaware of the new influx of
federal money into the district, the legislator would then put out messages to
constituents claiming credit for the allocation of federal money aimed at solving
the local problem." These credit-claiming messages would directly cultivate
support for the incumbent,8 6 thereby increasing the likelihood for re-election.
Theoretically, a legislator would be rewarded most for addressing a local problem
that (1) affects the greatest number of her voting constituents and in doing so, (2)
considers their policy preferences, or opinions on which policy solution should
be adopted to address the problem.
Since legislative resources are limited, it is in a legislator's best electoral

84.

BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY

SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE

(1987).

85. Justin Grimmer, Solomon Messing & Sean Westwood, How Words and Money Cultivate
a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent CreditAllocation, 106
Am. POL. SCI. REV. 703-19 (2012).
86. Id.
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interest to focus her attention on addressing the policy problems that affect the
greatest number of constituents. The more constituents the problem affects, the
greater the electoral payoff, because the enacted policy solution would inevitably
affect more voters. Moreover, if re-election is indeed an important consideration
for legislators, then solving a problem that affects populations that have high
voter turnout would provide the most re-election benefits for the legislator.
Solving a problem that affects wealthy donors would also be a strategic use of a
legislators' time, as doing so may attract additional campaign contributions. Not
only would legislators be most incentivized to focus on problems that affect the
greatest number of constituents, likely voters and wealthy donors, but they would
also be incentivized to consider the policy preferences of these groups when
choosing the type of policy solution to endorse.
Although such logic is sound, the literature is divided on whether or not
legislators pay more attention to the issues and opinions of demographic groups
that are more likely to turn out to vote. Demographics that have been associated
with voter turnout include race, income and education, with Whites that are
higher income earners reporting the highest voter turnout rate ("upper class
Whites")." Although Whites only represent 65% of the U.S. population, they
represented 75% of the voters in the 2014 election,89 suggesting that they have a
higher voter turnout rate than minority groups. Similarly, individuals in the
middle- to high-income brackets are more likely to vote than those in lower
income brackets. Individuals coming from families with incomes of less than
$30,000 made up only 16% of the voters in the 2014 election, even though they
represent 28% of the population.9 0 If legislators pay attention to the issues
affecting voters more than nonvoters, then addressing issues affecting White
middle-and upper-class constituents may appear to have a greater re-election
payoff and may therefore be prioritized, especially if some of these constituents
are generous campaign contributors.

87. See, e.g., James Avery, Does Who Votes Matter? Income Bias in Voter Turnout and
Economic Inequality in the American States from 1980 to 2010, 37 POL. BEHAV. 955-76 (2015).
88. Comparing the Results ofDifferent Likely Voter Models, in PEw RES. CTR, CAN LIKELY
2014 U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 14-18 (Jan. 7,
2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/01/PM_2016-01-07_likelyvotersFINAL.pdf.
89. Id.
VOTER MODELS BE IMPROVED? EVIDENCE FROM THE

90. As of 2014, the age group with the greatest age adjusted rates of overdose deaths are
white men and women between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four. See Rudd et al., supra note 27.
I was unable to locate the age group with the greatest age adjusted rate of overdose deaths in the
1980s and 1990s. Persons between the age of fifty and sixty-four are overrepresented at the poll.
See PEw RES. CTR., supra note 88. This suggests that they are considered likely voters whose
preferences may be especially important to legislators.
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Figure 1.
The empirical evidence supporting the contention that legislators are
influenced most by the preferences of upper-class Whites is mixed. Some studies
show that legislators tend to pay more attention to the opinions of high income
and wealthy individuals 9 ' and to non-Hispanic Whites' preferences over African
Americans or Latinos, even after controlling for income.9 2 While other studies
find no statistically distinguishable difference between high vs. low income
constituents.9 3 Conflicting studies also demonstrate that on issues that are
especially salient to minority groups, like crime, education, and healthcare, their
preferences are at least as influential as Whites.9 4
Although the findings in the literature are inconclusive, the evidence suggests
that at times legislators may prioritize the policy preferences of certain races or
classes over others. Therefore, it is plausible that legislators were willing to adopt
a health-oriented approach to the current opioid epidemic if upper-class Whites
or other likely voters were affected by the opioid epidemic and supported healthoriented solutions. Further, it is likely that as the opioid epidemic became more
geographically dispersed, more legislators saw the opioid epidemic as a problem

91. Fay Lomax Cook, Benjamin Page & Rachel Moskowitz, Political Participation by
Wealthy Americans, 129 POL. RES. Q. 381, 381-98 (2014); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY
VERBA

& HENRY E.
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(2012).

BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT: EVALUATING POLITICAL

EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2008).

93. Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S.
Senate?, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED? 223-46 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
94. Id. There is some question, however, as to whether such differences are true differences
or if they are due to the fact that districts with a majority of minority residents tend to be more
ideologically heterogeneous; when such heterogeneity is controlled for, differences in legislator
representation of preferences no longer exists. Brandice Canes-Wrone, From Mass Preferences to
Policy, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 147,147-65 (2015).
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affecting a large number of their local constituents and thereby worthy of their
time and attention.
2. The OpioidEpidemic as a Local Issue
As it has progressed, the opioid epidemic has become denser and more
geographically dispersed, affecting more local populations and states and doing
so at greater degrees (see Figure 1).9 From 2009 to 2015, the rate of overdose
deaths increased in most states and localities. But not only has the problem gotten
worse in the affected areas, but the problem has also spread to more communities,
more districts, and more states (See Figure 2).

2009.

95. Such increased geographic distribution has a number of consequences at the state and
federal level. For example, at the state level, as the problem increases in geographic range and
density, it reaches magnitudes at which the state cannot afford to address the problem without
federal assistance, resulting in state administrations lobbying federal legislators to provide federal
funds to assist. Such pleas for federal assistance may be made using media outlets and further
focuses constituents' attention on the need for federal legislative action.
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2015.
Figure 2.
And as the problem spreads to more legislators' districts and states, the opioid
epidemic has become a "local problem" for a greater number of legislators. As
more constituents become affected by problem drug use in the form of addiction
and overdose deaths, the calls from voters for legislative action to address the
problem are likely to increase. Since problem drug use devastates families,
networks of friends, co-workers, and members of the helping professions, one
overdose death affects a network of voters, thus magnifying the issue in ways the
maps in Figure 2 cannot begin to capture. The geographic distribution of the
problem spans the rural-urban divide and does not distinguish between
Republican or Democratic led states-unlike past drug epidemics that may have
been confined to certain urban or metropolitan areas. Given that the problem is
so geographically widespread, the bipartisan call for a legislative solution
becomes less surprising.
The opioid epidemic has cut across more than just geographic boundaries.
Whereas, past drug epidemics may have been confined to poor or otherwise
marginalized populations, the current epidemic is not confined to the poor nor is
the population comprised of primarily racial or ethnic minorities.9 6 The current

96. During the crack-cocaine epidemic of the late 1980s, overdose victims were primarily
poverty-stricken African Americans. See the following graph which I created using CDC data that
compares the rates of overdose deaths from 1979-1998 by race: CompressedMortality, 1979-1998
Charts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 13, 2017), https://wonder.cdc.gov/
controller/saved/D16/D19F641 [https://perma.cc/9YPW-H2ZK].
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population of overdose victims are whiter and more middle-class than previous
populations.9 7 The majority of overdose victims are still primarily members of the
lower class,98 yet there has been an increase in the number of overdose deaths in
both the middle-99 and upper-class-suggesting that the problem affects a variety
of constituents and affects "likely voters."
Since the opioid epidemic impacts sub-populations of constituents that have
traditionally had high voter turnouts, legislators may be more incentivized to
address problem drug use and to do so in a less stigmatizing manner. Solutions
that emphasize punishment and incarceration-and stigmatize the user-are
likely less popular when the population being targeted is a demographically
diverse cross-section of a legislator's constituency. When the affected
constituents are calling for legislative aid in addressing the opioid epidemic, they
are likely seeking help for themselves or their loved ones-help that is more
characteristic of health institutions than criminal justice institutions. Such claims
are facially convincing but do voter preference measures support the claim that
these affected populations prefer health-oriented solutions as opposed to criminal
justice solutions?
B. Voter Preferences Considerations

When ascertaining voter preferences on an issue, legislators likely look to
public opinion polls or media framing.'o Legislators also report considering
"latent public opinion," or how they believe the public will react if they were to
enact certain policies.' If these claims hold true, then a national shift in public
support for health approach versus a criminal justice approach would have
encouraged legislative support to shift in a similar direction. However, the
relationship between Congressional action and public opinion is complex.10 2

&

97. Admittedly, such changes, especially involving the racial composition of the target
population, likely contributed to the near-abandonment of a criminal justice approach for a health
approach-due in part to the racism endemic drug policy documented by other scholars. See
ALEXANDER, supranote 23.
98. Because the CDC provides income or education levels for overdose deaths in their
publicly facing query system, WONDER, it is difficult to discern which income bracket has the
greatest number of overdose victims. However, data from the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health does indicate that persons with an annual income of less than $20,000 has the greatest rate
of heroin use (as of 2011-2013, 5.5 per 100,000, compared to 2.3 for $20,000 to $49,999 and 1.6
for $50,000 or more). Although all income groups have seen in increase in the rate of heroin use
from 2002 to 2013. See Vital Signs: Today's Heroin Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/heroin/index.html [https://perma.cc/527Y-EDJ8] (last
updated July 7, 2015).
99. Id.
100.

JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES

(1984) [hereinafter

AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES].

101. V.O. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1961).
102. Robert S. Erikson, Roll Calls, Reputations, and Representation in the U.S. Senate, 15
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Although qualitative interviews with legislators suggest that legislators
consider public opinion when making decisions,' 0 3 the quantitative literature on
the congruence between public opinion and policy do not demonstrate a high
level of correlation between the policies supported by the majority of the
population and policies that are enacted by legislators.' 0 4 Such results, however,
may be explained by the limitations of the methodology, differential congruence
depending on sub-group, or differences between policy issues.o' Much of the
literature on policy congruence looks at the global opinion of the American public
on a number of policy issues when reporting their findings and do not explore
differences in congruence based on policy issue.' 0 6 On average, global public
opinion may not be congruent with policy, but some studies show that after
controlling for partisanship, legislators are responsive to local voter preferences
on issues" and state voter preferences. "' The global average may be masking
interesting individual differences. These individual differences may be further
evident when looking at specific policy domains, like drug policy, as opposed to
looking at a large category of policies, like social welfare policy. Further, the

Q. 623-42 (1990). First, elected officials may share values with the constituents who
elected them. Second, voters take cues from a legislator's stance on issues when deciding for whom
to vote. Third, elected officials may give weight to their district's preferences prior to voting on a
roll call. Id.
103. See, e.g., AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES, supra note 100; see also
RICHARD F. FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS (1978).
104. See, e.g., Matsusaka, supra note 65; Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic
LEGIS. STUD.

Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SC. 148, 153 (2012). These studies found legislative votes to
be congruent only 59% and 48% of the time, respectively.

105. Canes-Wrone, supra note 94.
106. An example of such is Matsusaka's article analyzing congruence of roll-call votes with
public opinion. John G. Matsusaka, When Do LegislatorsFollow Constituent Opinion? Evidence
from Matched Roll Call and Referendum Votes 11-12 (Stigler Ctr. for Study Econ. and State,

Working Paper No. 9, May 2017), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/
A048Fl608A6B4963A7A201259AEF03E9.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTP3-ETVU]. Matsusaka found
that legislators voted their district's preference only 65% of the time, which is 15% greater than
chance. Id. Further, Matsusaka found that policy congruence may depend on type of policy issue.
Id. For example, when analyzing California's gambling law, he only found a 27.9% congruence,
yet a 92.4% congruence was found when looking at California's health insurance law - suggesting
that policy specific factors may affect congruence. Id.
107. Larry M. Bartels, Constituency Opinion and CongressionalPolicy Making: The Reagan
Defense Buildup, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 457 (1991); Thomas Stratmann, CongressionalVoting
over Legislative Careers:Shifting Positionsand ChangingConstraints, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665

(2000).
108. Erikson, supra note 102; Christopher Warshaw, Are Senators More Responsive to Public
Opinion Later in the Electoral Cycle? (Columbia University Conference on Responsiveness,

Representation and Democracy, unpublished manuscript, Feb. 25, 2013),
https://responsiveness2013.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/warshaw-senators-more-responsive-laterin-cycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP5P-E3KY].
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literature exploring the effects of shifts in public opinion on legislative decisionmaking provides support for the idea that a shift in public support for a health
approach vs. a criminal justice approach may have preceded and influenced the
legislative shift evidenced by CARA.
1. Shifts in Public Opinion
There is strong support for the contention that legislators are responsive to
changes in public opinion, also called dynamic representation.' 0 9 It is
hypothesized that as public opinion changes, legislators sense the change and
alter their policy behavior in response, especially in anticipation of an upcoming
election."o Since voters replace legislators who are "out of step with public
opinion," legislators may be threatened with an electoral loss if they do not
respond to the change in opinion."' "When politicians perceive public opinion
change, they adapt their behavior to please their constituency and, accordingly,
enhance their chances of re-election.""12
Legislators are most likely to re-characterize an issue when the change in

109. Canes-Wrone, supra note 94.
110. See, e.g., AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES, supra note 100; James A.
Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 543 (1995); Thomas Hartley & Bruce Russett, Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who
Governs MilitarySpending in the United States?, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905 (1992); Christopher
Wlezien, Dynamics ofRepresentation: The Case of US Spending on Defence, 26 BRIT. J. POL. SC.
81 (1996); Mark A. Smith, Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation within a Market
Economy: Does the StructuralPower ofBusiness Undermine PopularSovereignty?, 43 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 842 (1999).
111. Canes-Wrone, supra note 94, at 149. If a legislator is not aligned with voters' preferences,
then she risks being replaced by another legislator. There is evidence that federal legislators are
sanctioned by voters for votes that are not popular with their constituents on issues concerning the
budget, Congressional salaries, and healthcare. See Gary C. Jacobson, Deficit-Cutting Politics and
CongressionalElections, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 375 (1993); John A. Clark, CongressionalSalariesand
the Politicsof UnpopularVotes, 24 AM. POL. RES. 150 (1996); Brendan Nyhan et al., One Vote Out
ofStep? The Effects ofSalient Roll Call Votes in the 2010 Election, 40 AM. POL. RES. 844 (2012).
Such accountability is more likely under certain political conditions than others. See, e.g., Steven
Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder & Charles Stewart, Constituents' Responses to Congressional
Roll-Call Voting, 46 AM. POL. SCI. J. 583 (2001). For example, recent research by Rodgers finds
that legislators are much less likely to be held accountable by voters at the state level. Steven
Rogers, ElectoralAccountabilityfor State Legislative Roll Calls and IdeologicalRepresentation,
111 AM. POL. SCI. J. 555 (2017). Some argue that this is likely a result of less media attention, more
uncompetitive political elections, and incumbency advantages at the state level. See, e.g., id.; JOHN
M. CAREY, RICHARD

G. NIEMI &

LYNDA

W.

POWELL, TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES

(2000); THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS
(Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006). However, others like Matsusaka, supranote
65, find that electoral pressure has no statistically significant effect.
112. Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson, supra note 110, at 545; see, e.g., Hartley & Russett, supra
note 110; Wlezien, supra note 110; Smith, supra note 110.
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public opinion is a "large[,] stable" change on a salient issue.113 Legislators
change their behavior on the margin, making the changes they can within their
ideological spectrum to match the change in public opinion." 4 Due to the
preference for the status quo built into the legislative system, "more than a
moderate level of popular support for a policy reform is generally needed for it
to be enacted.""' Further, there are structural conditions that can interfere with
the dynamic representation hypothesis, including: (1) partisan bias, (2)
manipulation of public opinion, (3) the electoral cycle, (4) issue salience, and (5)
policy domain." 6
2. Shifts in Public Opinion Coincidingwith Changesin the TargetPopulation
A factor that can impact the manner in which public opinion on an issue
shifts is the composition of the target population, or population that the policy
solution is thought to benefit or burden. For example, the target population of
policies enacted to address the opioid epidemic could include drug users, drug
suppliers, family members of drug users, or employers, among others. Legislators
choose from the list of affected actors when enacting a solution.
The demographics and characteristics of a target population can influence
both public and legislator perceptions of who or what caused the problem and
which legislative proposals are best suited to address the problem, due in part to
the social construction of categories of persons that are members of the target
population. These categories are defined by rules that determine the terms of
inclusion."' Schneider and Ingram argue that categories of persons are socially
constructed into two main types, those who are deserving of social assistance and
those who are undeserving. Examples of deserving populations include senior
citizens, veterans or active military, children, mothers, the middle-class, farmers
and the ill."' The poor, on the other hand, are constructed as undeserving. Due
in part to early Puritan influences on the development of American values, the
poor have been traditionally depicted as lazy and lacking discipline.1' Therefore,
Americans harbor a general distaste for policy benefits that appear to be
"handouts," or "unearned" benefits, to the poor.1 20
Individuals addicted to illicit substances have been traditionally categorized
alongside criminals as deviants, undeserving of public assistance.121 Past drug
epidemics in the U.S. have affected poor and marginalized populations that
resided in urban areas already riddled with crime, so even if the label of the drug

113.
Sd. REV.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

119.
(Yale U.
120.
121.

Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of PublicOpinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL.
175, 181 (1983).
Stimson, Mackuen, & Erikson, supranote 110.
Canes-Wrone, supra note 94, at 148.
Canes-Wrone, supra note 94.
STONE, supra note 8; SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15.
STONE, supra note 8; SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15.
See JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Press 2008).
See STONE, supranote 8.
Id.
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user as a criminal was not deserving, the correlation between drug use and crime
made the association believable. Moreover, according to Schneider and Ingram,
deviants are not only viewed as undeserving of public benefits, but are also
viewed as most deserving of punishment, often in the form of criminal
sanctions.122 Evidence from public discourse surrounding past drug epidemics
offer support for the claim that the poor are more likely to be constructed as
undeserving of benefits, like treatment. Drug policy historian Courtwright has
documented that as the demographics of the target population of drug users
changes from the upper middle-class to poor or from the mainstream to the
marginalized, public preferences shift from supporting treatment as a solution to
supporting criminal sanctions and incarceration of the user and his supplier.1 23
Unlike past drug epidemics, the current Opioid Epidemic has been
characterized as a "white" problem and as a problem that affects not only the
poor, but the middle-and upper-class as well. Since the middle-class is
constructed as a deserving class, Schneider and Ingram's typology would predict
that society would support policy solutions that benefit the target population of
drug users, as opposed to punishing them.1 24 The demographic changes to the
target population noted supra in Part III.A.2. support this contention as the target
population for the opioid epidemic includes categories of persons, like the
middle-class, that are socially constructed as more deserving of policy benefits
and less deserving of punitive solutions. But does the evidence support this
theorized shift in public support?
3. Evidence ofShifts in Public Opinion on DrugPolicy

According to Courtwright, legislators have historically perceived public
support for a criminal justice approach to problem drug use.1 25 He attributes this
legislative perception of public support to "a key electoral group, middle-class
suburban voters, [who] remained convinced that the punitive drug war was the
only thing standing between their children and a flood of drugs."1 26 To this
electoral group, any other approach, including the health approach, was too risky,
as it communicated to their children that they could experiment with drugs and
then just seek treatment.1 27 The punitive, or criminal justice approach, also
pleased religious conservatives whose votes were becoming "increasingly
important in the political equation. "128

122. SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15.
123. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supranote 18.
124. SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15. The social construction of the affected population
is not the only construction that affects public opinion and subsequently available legislative
solutions. Id. Certain groups may be viewed by the public as undeserving of public benefits but are
also politically powerful groups. Id. A group's political power can serve as a moderator for the
effects of social construction. Id.
125. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supranote 18.
126. Id. at 178.
127. See MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIx (U. California Press 2000).
128. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE, supra note 18, at 178. There does not appear to be any
formal analysis of drug policy and public opinion congruence. Studies analyzing public opinion and
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Although public support for a criminal justice approach has been historically
dominant with few exceptions, public opinion surveys suggest that there has been
a shift in public support away from criminal justice solutions and toward health
solutions. From 1988 to 2001, surveys indicated that the support for criminal
justice solutions declined.1 29 More specifically, support for arresting drug users
and drug dealers dropped from 37% to 30% and 59% to 49%, respectively.1 30 By
2001, the support for criminal justice solutions was still greater than healthoriented solutions, with support for treatment at a mere 36%. 131 Yet, the shift
away from the criminal justice approach laid the groundwork for the support for
the health-approach that was yet to come. By 2014, 67% of respondents
supported policy solutions that focused on treatment over prosecution.1 3 2 The
changes in public support from 1988 to 2014 evidence a steady shift in public

drug policy have focused mostly on the degree to which drug policy, as an issue, is salient and on
the public's agenda, as well as what causes drugs to make it onto the public's agenda. These studies
have focused on news media coverage of the drug problem, coding newspaper articles and
broadcast transcripts based on content and then conducting either a frequency analysis or an
ARIMA analysis to determine whether there has been a change over time in how the media frames
the drug problem. Such methodology is based on empirical analysis that shows that the saliency
of a news media frame increases the likelihood that a frame (1) will reflect the manner in which the
public defines an issue, (2) will influence the importance the public assigns the issue, and (3) will
influence legislators' framing of an issue. See e.g. WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 79;
GONZENBACH, supra note 83.
129. Interdiction and Incarceration Still Top Remedies, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 21, 2001),
http://www.people-press.org/2001/03/21/interdiction-and-incarceration-still-top-remedies/
[https://perma.cc/CBF8-M5AV] [hereinafter, PEW 2001].
130. All survey questions were designed and administered by Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, and the survey responses were weighted so that the results were representative
of the U.S. adult population. Id.
131. Notably, public support for "educating about drugs," which could be argued to be a health
promotion solution, also declined from 1988 to 2001. See PEw 2001, supranote 129; Figure 2. This
suggests that the public may have been dissatisfied overall with the effectiveness of government
intervention on the issue of problem drug use.
132. These figures summarize the results of a particular survey question used by Pew, in which
they asked survey respondents whether the government should focus more on "persecuting people
who use illegal drugs such as heroin or cocaine" or "focus more on providing treatment for people
who use these types of drugs." America's New Drug Policy Landscape: Two-Thirds Favor
Treatment, Not Jail, for Use of Heroin, Cocaine, PEW RES. CTR. 1 (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-02 -14%2ODrug%2OPolicy%20Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XFC6-BR3T] [hereinafter PEW, New Policy]. The findings are supported by a
recent study by Barry et al. See Colleen L. Barry et al., UnderstandingAmericans' Views on Opioid
Pain Reliever Abuse, 111 ADDICTION 85-93 (2016). Barry et al. aimed to uncover American's
views on the opioid epidemic. Id. Although the researchers did not ask respondents to report
whether they felt that opioid addicts should be penalized for their actions, or otherwise measure
support for criminal justice solutions, they did find substantial support for the health solutions that
were considered by legislators prior to passage of CARA. Id.
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opinion in support of health approaches to problem drug use over criminal justice
approaches.' 3 3 This is the type of large and stable shift in public opinion necessary
to create a change in legislator support. However, for the shift in public opinion
to be most effective in translating to a legislative problem redefinition and a
policy change, a coinciding shift in pressure group support for the problem
redefinition is ideal. In the following sub-section, I demonstrate how and why
pressure groups are theorized to affect legislative problem definition. I then
provide anecdotal evidence to support the claim that while pressure groups may
have supported a criminal justice approach in the past, pressure groups are likely
defining the opioid epidemic as a health problem involving health actors - thus
supporting the health shift evidenced in public opinion surveys.
C. PressureGroup Considerations
1. The Theoretical Literature:Problem Definition, PressureGroups & the
Policy Process
In the U.S., pressure groups can play an integral part in convincing legislators
to adopt a particular problem definition. 3 4 Groups compete for legislator time and
attention with the goal of being awarded the ability to define the problems that
affect their interests.' 3 5 Legislators look to pressure groups for not only campaign
finance and electoral support, but also subject matter expertise, research and even
assistance in implementing legislation. As such, changes in pressure group
framing can affect the contents of legislation drafted to address the problem.' 3 6
In competing to define the problem, groups vie for the ability to narrate the
"causal story" by explaining the cause of the problem, identifying who or what
is to be blamed for the problem and who should benefit from the problem

133. See PEW, New Policy, supra note 132, at 1. The 2014 support for treatment spanned
"nearly all demographic groups," with support being about the same whether or not the individual
viewed drug abuse as a crisis in their own local neighborhood (64% vs. 68%). Id. However,
Republicans did show less support for treatment (510%) than Democrats (77%) and Independents
(69%), which is not surprising since the 2001 Pew report, supra note 129, showed that less
Republicans considered addiction a disease than Democrats (61% v. 30%). Id. This suggests that
ideology may affect the strength of support for treatment solutions. Id. at 8. Aside from ideological
differences, differences in support for treatment vs. incarceration correlated with race and ethnicity
with 81% of Blacks supporting treatment over incarceration, compared to 66% of Whites and 61%
of Hispanics. Id. at 9.
134.

BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 14; SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15; STONE,

supranote 8.
135. STONE, supra note 8; Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions
FacilitateAccess to CongressionalOfficials: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SC.
545-58 (2016).
136.

BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 14; SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15; STONE,

supranote 8; Beth L. Leech, Lobbying and Influence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 534-51 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds.,
2010).
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solution.' 3 7 Pressure groups use these causal stories to assign blame and
responsibility for the problem, empower certain actors as the "fixers" of the
problem, create new political alliances, and "either challenge or protect an
existing social order."'3 8 By defining the problem with causal stories, groups also
limit the policy solutions that legislators are left with to those that best align with
their interests.' 3 9 According to Stone, pressure groups use common strategies to
define the problem for legislators in ways that (1) attribute blame to outside
groups, (2) limit alternative solutions, and (3) strategically define the target
populations.'4 0
a. Problem definition strategies:Attributing blame
By analyzing causal stories used in the policymaking process, Stone was able
to identify the following common causal theories-which argue that the policy
problem (1) was an accident of nature or fate, (2) was the result of "human
agency," (3) was a problem created by a "few bad apples," (4) was the result of
hidden motives, (5) was the result of a calculated risk that someone took, (6) was
the result of a purposeful action but one for which the individual or group could
not have possibly known the outcomes for, or (7) was the result of such a
complex process that it is simply out of the actors' control.141
Examples of such strategies can be found in recent causal stories used to
describe the cause of the current opioid epidemic. For example, the Attorney
General in Ohio recently pursued litigation against five pharmaceutical
companies for causing the current opioid epidemic in Ohio by intentionally
misrepresenting the addictive properties of opioid prescription painkillers.1 4 2 He
was quoted as saying, "They knew they were wrong, but they did it anyway-and
they continue to do it."1 4 3 In doing so, the Attorney General was blaming the
pharmaceutical companies for taking a calculated risk where the benefits, for the
company, would outweigh the costs and asserting that the opioid crisis in Ohio
was a result of willful acts. This shifts the blame to the pharmaceutical companies
as the actors that caused the epidemic. It also suggests to federal legislators that
the cause of the opioid epidemic was pharmaceutical companies' greed and that
the appropriate solutions to the problem include regulation and punishment.
Another example of strategic use of causal stories by a pressure group is
physicians' counter-story to the causal story that blames physicians for causing
the epidemic by overprescribing opioid painkillers. As a group, physicians would
want to shift blame from the medical community at large, to the "few bad

137.

STONE, supra note 8.
138. Id. at 223-24.
139. Rochefort & Cobb, supranote 7; STONE, supra note 8.
140. STONE, supra note 8.
141. STONE, supra note 8, at 233.
142. Press Release, Ohio Attorney Gen. Mike DeWine, Attorney General DeWine Files
Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers for Fraudulent Marketing; Fueling Opioid Epidemic, (May
31, 2017), www.ohioattomeygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/May-2017/Attomey-GeneralDeWine-Files-Lawsuit-Against-Opio [https://perma.cc/D9DY-SHCN].
143. Id.
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apples"-doctors who were intentionally and willfully trafficking in illegal drug
sales. An example of a legislative policy solution that aligns with this counter
causal story is a prescription monitoring program that identifies the bad apples
who are overprescribing. Such a solution targets the bad seeds, as opposed to
punishing the medical profession as a whole.
b. Problem definition strategies:Limiting alternativesolutions
Pressure groups craft causal stories not only to attribute blame, but also to
identify a causal theory that supports a particular legislative solution. Causal
stories are powerful in that they limit the policy alternatives, or acceptable
solutions ("alternatives") to the problem.' 4 4 So, for example, if the pharmaceutical
industry's willful acts have caused the current opioid epidemic, then the policy
solutions available involve regulating or penalizing the pharmaceutical industry.
Whereas, if physicians are to be blamed for the current opioid epidemic, then the
alternatives are prescription monitoring programs and punishing the bad apples.
Neither of these causal stories call for penalizing the drug user, because the drug
user did not cause the problem-the pharmaceutical industry and the physicians

did.
However, if we again shift back to blaming the drug user for his problem
drug use, blaming his poor moral character for failing to prevent him from
resisting sinfully pleasurable indulgencies if they are within his reach, then a
criminal justice solution is more likely. For example, if the cause of the increase
in heroin use is, instead, the influx of heroin from Mexico that inevitably results
in an increase in heroin use because populations at risk of problem drug use
cannot help but use if the supply is available, then building a wall between the
U.S. and Mexico and punishing those who supply and possess heroin is a viable
solution to the problem.' 4 5 Therefore, she who tells the story has the power to
limit the policy alternatives available by the way that she attributes the cause of
the problem.' 4 6 in sum, the causal story limits the policy alternatives available to
policies that address the cause of the problem, and if pressure groups describe
problem drug use as a health problem that involves health actors, legislators are
more likely to support a health solution.
In order to best limit the policy alternatives to their desired choices, pressure
groups utilize certain strategies when deciding which cause of the problem to
focus on in their causal stories. According to Stone, some common strategies used
to limit alternative solutions include: (1) using the causal narrative to make the
preferred alternative the only apparent solution, (2) "focus[ing] on one part of the
causal chain and ignor[ing] others that would require politically difficult or costly
policy actions," (3) in analyzing the evidence, focusing on consequences that

144. Rochefort & Cobb, supranote 7; STONE, supra note 8.
145. KHNMorningBriefing: Trump Blaming Mexico ForN.H.'s Opioid CrisisExposesLack
OfUnderstandingOfThe Epidemic, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 4,2017), http://khn.org/momingbreakout/trump-blaming-mexico-for-n-h-s -opioid-crisis-exposes-lack-of-understanding-of-theepidemic/ [https://perma.cc/2CBD-JA53]. Such a supply driven causal theory also attributes blame
to the supplier who keeps in abundant supply the irresistible substance.
146. Rochefort & Cobb, supranote 7; STONE, supra note 8.
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make their preferred alternative appear to be the best solution, and (4) ensuring
that the alternative hurts the most powerful constituents, or "advantaged" targets
least,1 4 7 but still appears to be best for the social good 48 and punishes any social
deviants.1 49
Examples of such strategies can be found not only in drug policy, but in
health policy in general. For example, S. Bryn Austin demonstrated how in the
late 1980s to early 1990s public health officials teamed up with the food industry,
most notably, ConAgra, Inc., a manufacturer of a new food brand Healthy
Choice, to battle obesity.' Although there was not much scientific evidence that
demonstrated a link between dietary fat and poor health outcomes, it was dietary
fat that was focused on in the causal chain of obesity. Nestl6's Stouffer's Lean
Cuisine division soon joined the movement, investing money in what was then
called Project LEAN (Low-Fat Eating for American Now). By limiting the focus
on the causal chain to dietary fat, these groups were able to limit the alternative
solutions to educating the public on the harmful effects of fat and the benefits of
a low-fat diet, meanwhile profiting from increased sales of their new diet food
lines.' The power of narratives extends beyond drug policy.
2. Theoretical Literature:PressureGroup Influence
The preceding sub-section provided evidence of the role that pressure groups
play in the problem definition discourse. The following sub-sections explain
additional factors that may influence a legislator's receptiveness to a pressure
group's narrative. Since the literature on interest group influence is distinct from
that discussing administrative agency influence, I have presented summaries of
each literature separately.
a. Interest group influence and Congress
Influence is often narrowly defined by the interest group literature as "the
power to change a public policy or to defeat efforts to have the policy
changed."' 5 2 The ways that interest groups are theorized to influence policy are
(1) by providing campaign contributions, (2) by providing legislators with insight
as to the preferences of their constituents and mobilizing its members for or
against a legislator, and (3) by acting as "service bureaus" that provide research,
information, and popular support.13
(1) Campaign contributions andpressure group resources
Much of a legislator's campaign funds come from interest groups. 5 4 It is
hypothesized that legislators pay special attention to donors who donate

147.

SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note

148.
149.

STONE, supra note

15.

8, at 260.

SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 15, at 104.
150. S. Bryn Austin, Constructing the Need for "Low Fat" Food, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS:
CONSTRUCTIONIST READINGS 180, 180-88 (Donileen R. Loseke & Joel Best eds., 2003).
151. Id.
152. Leech, supra note 136.
153. Id. at 536.
154. Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy
Preferencesof Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 51-73 (2013).
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substantial money to campaigns because the money can buy advertising to help
increase the chances that the legislator will be re-elected." Further legislators
may give preferential treatment to interest groups who donate to other legislators'
campaigns, based on the belief that they may be able to elicit funds from the
group in the future.'
Scholars theorize that legislators may see campaign contributions as shared
values, preferences, or expertise." A recent study by Kalla and Broockman
found that interest groups who donate to Congressional campaigns have the most
access to having their opinions heard.'
Access to Congress does not
automatically mean that Congress will adopt the groups' position, but it does
increase the likelihood that the group will be able to influence the framing of
policy.1 59

The degree to which legislators believe that campaign finance is important
is reflected in the amount of time legislators spend per day trying to raise
campaign funds.' Perceptions of the importance of campaign finance is also
reflected in interest group campaign finance activity of groups that have high
exposure to regulation. More specifically, interest groups with such potential
exposure are much more likely to contribute campaign funds to legislators who
have committee seats in policy areas that affect that group.161
Although theoretically and anecdotally, access to legislators seems likely to
result in interest group influence, there is insufficient quantitative evidence to
show a causal impact of contributions.1 6 2 While some studies evidence a
correlation between financial contributions to legislators and policy outcomes,
others do not.1 63 Leech suggests this may be because all such studies focus on
dichotomous, yes or no votes on a policy as the outcome measure, thereby
ignoring other parts of the policy making process where interest groups may have
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influenced the policy process-for example by affecting which issues reach the
agenda or how legislators talk about a policy problem.' 6 4
Baumgartner et al. argue that campaign contributions and lobbying
expenditures alone do not adequately measure the resources that groups have
available to them to affect a policy redefinition, which is why studies sometimes
find a relationship and other times do not.'6 5 For example, the number of former
Congressional staffers employed by an organization 6 6 may be considered a more
predictive resource than campaign contributions. To improve upon campaign
contributions as measures of influence, Baumgartner et al. used disclosures under
the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to identify other resources, like the number
of lobbyists per organization who were former Congressional staff members or
high-level officials.' 6 7 Disclosures were also used to identify campaign
contributions and soft-money contributions to parties for two successive two-year
election cycles before the policy outcome.' 6 8 Even though Baumgartner et al.
defined interest group resources more broadly than their predecessors, they still
found little correlation between a pressure group's resources and specific policy
outcomes. An individual pressure group's resources did not seem to predict
whether its desired policy outcome would be adopted.' 6 9
Baumgartner et al. then shifted their analysis from the individual level to the
population level and compared the aggregate resources of all interest groups for
each "side" of a policy issue.' In their definition of interest group resources,
Baumgartner et al. included high ranking officials in government, including
administrative officials."' Their subsequent analysis showed that the side
supported by the greatest number of high ranking government officials was most
likely to be successful. 7 2 The higher ranking the government official, the
better.' 7 3 Further, if a "side" was seeking to redefine a problem, it was more likely
to succeed if supported by high ranking government officials.' 7 4 Not surprisingly,
the president being on the side of the policy change was also a significant
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predictor.'" Aside from support from high-ranking government officials, a
general resource advantage did seem to aid the side mobilizing for policy change,
especially during the first two years of mobilization." 6
In sum, although campaign contributions and resources at groups' disposal
are believed to affect the groups' ability to lobby legislators to adopt their
problem definition and policy solution, the relationship between lobbying
resources and success in doing so is not always evident in the literature. As such,
lobbying resources by any one specific organization may not have caused the
redefinition of problem drug use as a health problem prior to CARA's enactment.
Baumgartner, et al.'s work, however, suggests that the "health side" of the
problem definition discourse likely had greater lobbying resources, including
access to campaign contributions and support from high-ranking administrative
officials."' Before such conclusions can be drawn, of course, a systematic
analysis of the lobbying resources available to the health side of the problem
definition discourse prior to CARA is needed.
(2) Influence as information on constituents' preferences and as a
legislative subsidy
Groups that contribute to legislators' campaigns or have access to electoral
resources are not the only interest groups that are theorized to affect how a
problem is defined or the types of policy proposal adopted to address a problem.
Interest group theorists have challenged the "exchange theories" of lobbying that
depict lobbying as a simple exchange of campaign contributions for votes and
propose instead "persuasion theories" that theorize that interest groups are
influential because they have access to constituency's opinions on policy issues,
giving legislators information that they would not have otherwise had about how
policy actions may affect their re-election prospects."' Unfortunately, there is not
much support for this theory, as interviews with lobbyists reveal that when
advocating for a policy proposal to legislators, lobbyists use arguments that are
"electoral in nature" less than 3% of the time.1 7 9
Hall and Deardorff suggest that interest groups use yet another tool to
influence legislators-a legislative resource subsidy.' Hall and Deardorff
theorize that pressure groups are powerful, not just because they contribute to
political campaigns, but mostly because they can also offer "costly policy
information, political intelligence and legislative labor," also referred to as a
"legislative subsidy.""' Although Hall and Deardorff do not explicitly refer to
administrative agencies as offering a legislative subsidy, administrative agencies
can provide a legislative subsidy just the same, as they provide detailed reports
and information on specific subject matters often outside the expertise of
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legislators. While providing this legislative subsidy, both organized interest
groups and administrative agencies are in a prime position to define the policy
problem.
Public interest groups, or citizens groups, are especially situated to provide
credible and researched expertise and reports, putting them at an advantage for
the provision of information in comparison to other interest groups due to their
research accuracy and credibility.'8 2 In order for legislators to influence
legislation, they require "in-depth policy analysis, reports or expertise" that can
be provided by public interest groups thereby saving legislators the time and
resources they would have spent on compiling such information.' 8 3 "Matthews
(1960, 182) observed, quoting one senator: 'They can tell me in thirty minutes or
less what it would take me hours to learn through reading and study."" 8 4
Legislators are also aware that reports produced by public interest groups are
likely to be received more favorably by the press than reports produced by
industries."' This may be why Baumgartner, et. al. found that citizens groups
were most likely to be named by legislators as the central actors on an issue,18 as
their provision of such reports can be indispensable to defining a policy problem.
b. Administrative agency influence
Organized interests are not the only groups that provide legislators with
policy-relevant information. Federal administrative agencies, even those outside
of the Cabinet, are another source of policy expertise and information.' Their
influence on legislators is independent of the President and his cabinet.' A
longitudinal analysis of the issue attention cycle of the media, public attention,
and the legislative activity on problem drug use in the U.S. found that problem
drug use only made the public agenda after an administrative agency released
reports citing a rise in addiction or overdose deaths.' 8 9
Policy entrepreneurs within administrative agencies, policy-makers invested
in defining a problem in particular manner or in seeking certain policy solutions,
can further influence legislative decision-making.' 9 0 Baumgartner et al. found that
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41% of advocates for the adoption of a side on a policy issue were government
officials.1 9 ' Because Congress relies on administrative agencies to interpret
legislation, as well as implement and enforce it, administrative acceptance of a
problem definition and solution is exceedingly important-regardless of whether
or not Congress is controlled by the same political party for which the President
is a member. Further, noting the influence of administrative agency officials,
organized interest groups often team-up with administrative agency officials that
support their lobbying position in the hopes of forming a stronger coalition. The
most successful lobbying groups are the ones that work with, not only policy
entrepreneurs in Congress, but also high-level bureaucrats in the federal
administration who support their policy stance on an issue.19 2
Aside from federal administrative agency support, successful problem
redefinition has occurred when (1) pressure groups, who were previously absent
from discourse, joined and supported the problem redefinition, (2) new networks
or coalitions of pressure groups supporting the problem redefinition emerged,
and/or (3) there was a substantial and punctuated shift in mobilization and
resources to the "redefinition" side. 9 3 in sum, pressure groups, including
administrative agencies and interest groups, influence the types of policy
proposals adopted, due in part to their influence on legislative decision-making.
Such influence is further evidenced by an analysis of drug policy history.
3. Evidence ofPressure Group Activity in Drug Policy
Although a systematic analysis of pressure group involvement in the problem
definition of the current Opioid Epidemic has yet to be published, historical
analysis of pressure group activity in drug policy suggests that pressure groups
have been active in the problem definition process and have a continued interest
in continuing to lobby for the adoption of particular problem definitions and
policy proposals. Historically, physicians, pharmacists, prescription drug
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manufacturers, and the Narcotics Bureau (which was later merged with the Drug
Enforcement Agency) have had political and strategic reasons for supporting
certain problem definitions and policy solutions over others.' 9 4 Such problem
definitions have historically influenced the types of legislative solutions enacted,
including whether or not that definition supports health-oriented versus criminal
justice oriented legislative solutions,' 9 5 and will arguably continue to do so.
However, for most of these groups, the role that they may or may not have had
in defining the Opioid Epidemic as a health versus a criminal justice issue has yet
to be empirically documented. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
pressure groups have been on the "health-side" of the current policy debate.
For example, in the past, and the present, the medical profession has been
blamed for creating classes of opiate addicts who were initially prescribed the
opiate by a prescriber ("iatrogenic addicts").' 9 6 Such accusations have historically
mobilized organized interest groups representing these professions, including the
American Medical Association ("AMA") and the American Pharmacists
Association ("APhA").'9 7 Although one might predict that such groups would
always support a health-oriented approach to addressing problem drug use,
historically, these groups have supported the approach most aligned with their
immediate needs. For instance, the AMA has oscillated between supporting the
contention that addiction is a disease that necessitates treatment by the medical
profession to supporting the claim that addicts were persons with psychosocial
personality disorders who must be locked away so as not to do harm to
themselves or to society.' 9 8 Courtwright argues that the AMA has advocated for
the remedy of treatment most when the addict population was comprised of a
class of persons that physicians preferred treating: White, middle-to upper-class
populations.' 9 9 Courtwright contends that when the population of addicts became
poorer and lower class, the AMA adopted the view that addiction was a result of
a personality disorder that law enforcement officials were best suited to handle. 20 0
Similarly the APhA has supported the addiction as a disease narrative
explicitly when doing so aligned with their policy objectives of maintaining a
legal supply of opiates to prescribe and include in druggists' elixirs. 201' For subpopulations of users that were marginalized, like Chinese immigrants, the APhA
adopted popular narratives of deviancy and supported punitive solutions.2 0 2 The
APhA drafted early model drug legislation for states and convened working
groups to negotiate the terms of the nation's first large scale opiate regulation, the
Harrison Tax Act of 1914, evidencing the medical profession's influence on early
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drug policy. 203 However, when their financial stake in the problem definition
disappeared, so did their involvement in the problem definition discourse and
their support for a health-oriented disease narrative. 20 4
Further systematic analysis is needed to determine whether there has been a
marked increase in the medical industry's involvement in the legislative discourse
prior to CARA's enactment and whether their contribution to the discourse
supported a health-oriented approach-an approach that was subsequently
embodied in CARA. However, preliminary evidence suggests that health actors
have been supportive of a health-oriented approach. Namely congressional
testimony by members of the medical industry, supports the claim that problem
drug use is a health issue or a disease that needed prevention, education and
treatment.205
Drug manufacturers may have also influenced the problem definition of drug
use as a health issue. Historically, the drug manufacturing industry's support for
a health approach was also influenced by their financial stake in the outcome, as
was their involvement in the drug policy discourse. In the nascent stage of U.S.
drug manufacturing the pharmaceutical industry was dominated by so called
"patent" medicine manufacturers who commonly utilized cocaine and opiates in
their over-the-counter medication that were marketed directly to consumers. 2 06 It
was therefore in their interest to support a health-oriented definition of opiate and
cocaine use to ensure its continued legalization. As "ethical drug companies"
began to dominate, companies that were more focused on research and
discovering new drugs, the needs and interests of the drug industry evolved.207
Their support for a health approach dissipated, as did their general involvement
in drug policy. However, as new forms of MAT develop and demand for opioid
reversal medications increase, drug manufacturers have renewed incentives to
engage in the drug policy discourse. Again, systematic analysis is needed here to
identify the causal theories supported by these drug manufacturers and the degree
to which such causal stories align with a health-approach. However, defining
addiction as a disease of the brain aligns quite well with the access to medication
as a solution.
Aside from the medical industry's involvement in the problem definition
discourse, administrative agency officials have historically had significant
influence on the legislative approach to problem drug use. Although Richard
Nixon is often remembered for having declared the first "war on drugs," with
subsequent presidents declaring similar "wars," it was not the president who was
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the first to resort to a militarized, criminal response to drugs, but rather, high level
bureaucrats in the administrative branch. Henry Anslinger, of the Narcotics
Bureau (NB), is often cited as the father of America's criminal justice approach
to drug control. 20 8 Anslinger began as an upper level bureaucrat in the Prohibition
Bureau during the Progressive Era and maintained his Prohibition Era rhetoric for
the thirty-two years of his tenure, during which he influenced Congress through
his emotionally-charged stories and half-truths. 20 9 Anslinger fueled fearful,
punitive responses to problem drug use and perpetuated the construction of the
drug user as a criminal and deviant within the DEA, well before the first president
declared the first of the many "wars" on drugs that was to come. 2 10 Anslinger's
influence is reported to have had a lasting effect on the culture and approach
taken by the DEA to address problem drug use. 2 1 ' The DEA's influence on
Congress did not end when Anslinger left.
How administrative agency officials have influenced the problem definition
of the opioid epidemic has yet to be documented. Notably, the DEA's reference
to drug users not as deviants or criminals, but as friends, families, co-workers and
neighbors in congressional hearing testimony regarding the opioid epidemic
suggests that the DEA has changed its rhetoric. 212 Further, although the legislative
solutions supported by the testimony focused on decreasing the supply of drugs,
the solutions proposed were not exclusively criminal justice oriented, in that they
involved and were even partially administered by health actors. 213 Given
Baumgartner et al.'s conclusion that administrative agency support of a problem
redefinition is important to successful problem redefinition, this anecdotal
evidence suggests that shifts in the DEA's problem definition may have
influenced the legislative support for less criminal justice oriented solutions and
in the least, a facially more health-oriented approach.
In conclusion, the contention that pressure groups influence how a policy
problem is characterized is evidenced in drug policy history. Although a detailed
analysis of pressure groups' involvement in the problem definition discourse prior
to CARA's enactment is still needed, anecdotal evidence suggests that certain
groups that have been historically active in drug policy may have contributed to
support the definition of the Opioid Epidemic as a problem necessitating a healthoriented solution.
V. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have provided an interdisciplinary review of theories of
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legislative decision-making and in doing so, provided evidence to support the
relevance of these theories to explaining the types of legislative proposals
adopted to address the current opioid epidemic. Using these theories as a
foundation, I proposed that legislators considered local needs, voter preferences,
interest group preferences and administrative agency preferences when deciding
to adopt a health-oriented approach to the opioid epidemic. More specifically, I
provided evidence to support the claim that in adopting a health approach,
legislators acted to ensure re-election and create good public policy by a solving
a pressing social problem that affected local voters in a manner supported by
voters, interest groups and administrative agencies. The evidence presented in this
article only demonstrates that such a theory is viable and that additional empirical
research is needed to verify its true utility. However, it narrows down the possible
influential factors to a manageable number of most likely candidates. It also
provides interested researchers and scholars with a framework to verify and build
on.
Moreover, it contributes to the discourse by explaining how changes in the
demographics of drug users, particularly changes in the race or class of drug
users, or the rural or metropolitan distribution of a drug problem, can factor into
a legislator's decision-making process. Even without considering the effects of
explicit or implicit racial bias, this article demonstrates that legislators are
incentivized to define policy problems in ways that not only result in the adoption
of good policy, but also ensure their re-election. Legislators, in concert with other
actors, construct policy problems and solutions and when such a construction
aligns with public opinion and pressure group preferences, that construction is
most likely to become an enacted legislative solution. Such an acknowledgement
is powerful in that it provides advocates with tools with which to affect the policy
process and convince legislators to adopt certain policy solutions over others. As
applied to the case of drug policy, understanding the factors that convinced
Congress to abandon its longstanding love affair with ineffective criminal justice
solutions and commit to more empirically supported public health solutions,214
will allow advocates to try to prevent Congress resorting to ineffective criminal
justice solutions when faced with drug epidemics in the future.
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